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Abstract
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households and capital-
skill complementarity in the production function to study aggregate and distributional e¤ects
of scal consolidation policies when government uses a rich set of productivity-enhancing
spending instruments along with utility-enhancing spending and tax scal instruments. Fis-
cal policy is conducted through simple scal rules. We study both ad-hoc and optimized
scal rules. Our main results indicate that ad-hoc scal consolidation policies, either through
spending cuts or tax increases, are recessionary and entail an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in
the short- and medium-run. That is spending-based consolidation policies are less reces-
sionary but come at a higher distributional cost; whereas tax-based consolidation policies
result in sharper output losses but have smoother distributional e¤ects. In addition, scal
consolidation policies through optimized scal rules can be expansionary and social welfare
enhancing while at the same time balance the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 world nancial crisis found most European countries in a vulnerable scal position
with high decits and debts above the 3% and 60% of the Stability and Growth Pact limits.1
As a result several European governments have been forced to take restrictive scal actions the
so called scal consolidation.
By now most studies nd that scal consolidation entails an intertemporal trade-o¤ for the
main macroeconomic aggregates. That is the early phase of scal pain with public spending
cuts or/and tax increases to achieve the lower public debt target and the longer-run phase of
scal gain when debt reduction has been achieved and the resulting scal space can be utilized
to increase spending or reduce taxes. However, scal consolidation seems to also have important
distributional implications. For example Furceri et al. (2015) nd that during scal consolidation
periods the lowest income and wealth quantiles of the population became worse o¤ in terms of
net income. In addition, consolidation e¤orts usually come at the expense of growth-friendly
spending items such as spending on public investment and education which further harms the
prospects of long term growth.2
This paper seeks to answer questions like what are the aggregate and distributional impli-
cations of scal consolidation policies? Does scal consolidation generate an equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤? Do tax- and spending-based scal consolidation policies di¤er in their distributional
implications? We examine whether answers to these questions depend on the scal policy mix
chosen, on the type of heterogeneity incorporated in the model and the measure of inequality
under consideration.
To this end, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households
calibrated for Euro Area over the period 2001-2015. The model includes two types of households,
capital-skill complementarity in the production function in the spirit of Krusell et al. (2000)
and endogenous human-capital accumulation. Households di¤er both in the type of labour they
supply and their access to capital and nancial markets.3 Households that can save in the form of
government bonds, own physical capital and rms and supply skilled labour services are referred
to as Rich. While households that do not have access to nancial and capital markets, i.e. they
live hand-to-mouth, and supply unskilled labour services are referred to as Poor. In a Ricardian
1There is by now a tendency of declining public decits in the Euro Area. This is reected not only in statistical
indicators but also in the number of countries that are still under the Excessive Decit Procedure (EDP). The
structural decit in the EU was reduced markedly from 4.3 % to 1.0 % in the Euro-Area. At the country level,
while only ve Member States recorded decits below the 3% of GDP reference threshold in 2010, 22 did so in
2014. Currently only Spain is over the 3% threshold and subject to the EDP. See European Commission (2017)
2See European Central Bank (2017) for a discussion on the trade-o¤s between scal consolidation and reforms.
3There are di¤erent ways to introduce heterogeneous agents in DSGE models. For instance, Gali et al. (2007),
Coenen et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2009), Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2017) use models in which a share of
households does not have access to nancial or/and capital markets (Ricardian vs Non-Ricardian). Households
can also exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their impatience (patient vs impatient) as in Bilbiie et al. (2012), their
labour market status (public vs private sector workers) as in Ardagna (2007) and Economides et al. (2015) or
with respect to their education and skills as in Angelopoulos et al. (2014), Dolado et al. (2018) and Gomes
(2018).
2
world representative agents can smooth out exogenous scal changes like scal consolidation
through lending or borrowing. In this paper we depart from this world by adding skill and asset
heterogeneity; this aggravates the macroeconomic implications of scal policy changes and allow
for distributional analysis which poses additional challenges in the analysis of scal consolidation
policies.
Regarding policy, government has a rather rich set of spending and tax instruments at
its disposal. Particularly, government levies consumption, labour and capital taxes to nance
productivity-enhancing spending like public investment and spending on education, utility-
enhancing expenditures like government consumption and public transfers to Rich and Poor
households. Following most of the literature on debt consolidation we follow a rule-based ap-
proach to policy. This means that all the scal instruments can respond to the gap between
public debt and the target of public debt as shares of output. Fiscal policy coe¢ cients in the
associated scal rules are either set exogenously (referred to as ad-hoc policy) or to maximize a
welfare criterion following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) (referred to as optimized policy).
Our main policy experiment is scal consolidation. That is the economy starts from a steady-
state with high debt-to-GDP ratio, say 85% as in EA-18 data average over 2001-2015 and travels
towards a new reformed steady-state with lower debt-to-GDP ratio, say 60%. We experiment
with various reformed economies varying the scal instrument which reaps the benet of scal
space after debt consolidation. Government can achieve the transition from the status-quo to
the new reformed steady-state by implementing alternative scal consolidation policy mixes. We
study both ad-hoc and optimized policy. For each scenario, we compute the aggregate e¤ects
using variables like output and social welfare and distributional e¤ects using variables like net
income, skill premium and household-specic welfare.
Our main results are as follows. First, ad-hoc debt consolidation policies either through
tax hikes or spending cuts are recessionary in the short- and medium-run; however, spending
cuts induce crowding in e¤ects in private consumption and investment of Rich households and
as result mitigate output contraction. On the other hand, distortionary tax increases result
in negative supply-side e¤ects that cause a sharper and more prolonged recession. Second, in
terms of inequality spending-based consolidation comes at a distributional cost as it is more
harmful for income, wage and welfare distribution. Reduction in spending instruments like
utility-enhancing government consumption and public transfers a¤ect disproportionally Poor
households while gains from debt consolidation like increases in private investment and capital
stock benets relatively more Rich households. The latter is more pronounced in our model
due to capital-skill complementarity e¤ect. Third, tax-based scal consolidation results in a
higher output loss but has a relatively smoother distributional impact. Income tax increases
are more harmful for Rich householdsincome and welfare since Rich households earn returns
from capital and receive higher wages. Fourth, optimized policy can perform better than ad-hoc
spending- or tax-based scal consolidation policies over all time horizons and for all households.
In particular, scal consolidation policy through optimized scal rules can be expansionary and
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social welfare enhancing as well as can mitigate (but not eliminate) the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤
in the short- and medium-run.
Literature related to our work includes debt consolidation in dynamic general equilibrium
models in heterogeneous household setups as in Coenen et al. (2008), Schwarzmüller and Wolters
(2017) and Roubanis (2019) who study ad-hoc debt consolidation policies when agents are
heterogeneous with respect to their access to nancial markets. Economides et al. (2012)
focus on the implications of debt consolidation when agents di¤er with respect to their labor
market status, e.g. public sector versus private sector workers. Our work is also related to debt
consolidation studies e.g. Forni et al. (2010), Almeida et al. (2013), Bi et al. (2013), Cogan et
al. (2013), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Pappa et al. (2015) and Economides et al. (2017) who focus
on the aggregate macroeconomic implications of ad-hoc debt consolidation policies in various
models. Cantore et al. (2012), Philippopoulos et al. (2015), (2017a) and (2017b) study debt
consolidation policies in closed and open economies setups under optimized rules. Our work is
also related to papers that study scal policy reforms in dynamic general equilibrium models
with heterogeneous agents like Garcia-Mila et al. (2010), Angelopoulos, Asimakopoulos and
Malley (2017), Angelopoulos, Jiang and Malley (2017), Gomes (2018), Michaud and Rothert
(2018), however they do not focus on the distributional e¤ects of debt consolidation.
In our work, by contrast, we consider a joint heterogeneity setup including asset and skill
heterogeneity to assess debt consolidation.4 Moreover, we compare ad-hoc (spending- and tax-
based) with optimized policies while we compute optimized scal policy rules for a rich set
of spending (utility- and productivity-enhancing) and tax instruments.5 Finally, we provide a
systematic framework to assess the aggregate as well as the distributional e¤ects of alternative
scal consolidation policies.
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves
for the Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium. Section 3 explains our calibration strategy and
solves for the status quo steady-state solution. Next, in Section 4 we describe the main policy
experiments while in Section 5 we present our results. Section 6 discusses robustness analysis.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Informal description of the model
We develop a closed-economy dynamic general equilibrium model which consists of households,
rms and a government. The key feature of the model is household heterogeneity. Households
di¤er in two aspects. First, in the type of labour they supply and second in their access to
4See e.g. He and Liu (2008), Angelopoulos et al. (2014), Dolado et al. (2018) and the references therein on
the interaction of various scal and monetary policies with inequality.
5Regarding the productivity-enhancing instruments, apart from public investment which contributes to the
accumulation of public capital stock which is growth-enhancing we also examine the role of public spending on
education which can work also as a social pillar for the less wealthy households.
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nancial and capital markets. Thus we incorporate ex ante skill and wealth heterogeneity. In
particular households that have access to capital and nancial markets, supply skilled labour
services and own private rms are referred to as Rich. Households that do not participate in
capital and nancial markets and supply unskilled labour services; thus, only consume their
after-tax labour income referred to as Poor.6 In addition, both household types can accumulate
human capital using a human capital production function à la Lucas while they yield utility
from public consumption.
On the production side, rms use physical and public capital, skilled and unskilled labour in
order to produce an homogeneous good. In the production sector we incorporate a nested CES-
Cobb Douglas production function similar to Krusell et al. (2000) which exhibits capital-skill
complementarity. As it is known this feature gives rise to the so called skill premium.
Government has a rather rich set of scal policy instruments at its disposal. In particular,
it issues public debt and levies consumption, labour and capital income taxes to nance its
stream of public expenditures, namely spending on public education and investment, govern-
ment consumption and transfer payments which are allowed to be allocated unevenly between
households.
2.2 Population composition
The population size, N is exogenous and constant. It is comprised by two types of households,
i.e. Rich households indexed by the subscript R = 1; 2; ::::; NR and Poor households indexed by
the subscript P = 1; 2; ::::; NP where NR > NP and NP +NR = N is the total size. No mobility
or occupational change is possible between the two types. There are also f = 1; 2; :::::; Nf rms.
For notational convenience, we assume also that Nf = NR.
2.3 Rich households
Each Rich household, R; maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility given by:
VR;0  E0
1X
t=0
tUR;t (cR;t; zR;t; g
c
t ) (1)
where cR;t and zR;t are consumption and leisure of each household, gct is per capita utility-
enhancing government consumption7 and 0 <  < 1 is the discount rate. The period utility
function UR;t (:) is increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments. For convenience we use
the following functional forms:
UR;t (cR;t; zR;t; g
c
t ) = 1log (cR;t + g
c
t ) + 2log (1  eR;t   lR;t) (2)
6We follow Michaud and Rothert (2018) by referring to the two types of households as Rich and Poor.
7Notice that gct  g
c
t
N
where gct is total utility enhancing government consumption.
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where 1; 2 are preference parameters,  measures the degree of substitutability between private
and public consumption, e.g. if  > 0 (< 0) private and public consumption are substitutes
(complements). Households are endowed with a normalised time unit:
zR;t + eR;t + lR;t = 1 (3)
where lR;t and eR;t is time devoted to labour and education respectively. The within period
budget constraint of each Rich household, R, is:
(1 +  ct) cR;t + iR;t + dR;t = (1  kt ) (rtkR;t + R;t) +

1   lt

wR;tlR;thR;t + trR;t + r
b
tbR;t (4)
where iR;t; is private investment, kR;t, physical capital, bR;t, government bonds whose gross
returns are rt and rbt respectively, hR;t, is human capital, dR;t, is savings in the form of government
bonds, R;t is dividends received from private rms, wR;t is the wage rate earned by Rich
households, trR;t  trR;tNR is public transfers per Rich household and 0 < kt ;  lt;  ct < 1, are tax
rates on capital income, labour income and consumption respectively. Because Rich households
supply skilled labour services while Poor households supply unskilled labour services to rms,
Rich households receive a relatively higher wage wR;t > wP;t (for more details see section 2.5).8
To allow for productive education expenditures we use a human capital production function as
in Lucas (1988) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).9 Therefore, individual human capital is
augmented by time spent in education, eR;t, and by public spending on education, geR;t  !get ;
which is a xed share ! of per capita public spending on education, get .
10 The law motion of
human capital of Rich household, R, is:
hR;t+1 = (1  h)hR;t +BR
h
(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR (5)
where BR > 0,  2 (0; 1), xR < 1 are productivity parameters, and h is the depreciation rate
of human capital. Following He and Liu (2008), xR < 1, captures decreasing returns to scale in
the production of new human capital. The law of motions of physical capital and government
bonds for each R are:
kR;t+1 = (1  k)kR;t + iR;t (6)
bR;t+1 = bR;t + dR;t (7)
8Throughout the rest of the paper we call labour provided by Rich households as skilled labour and labour
provided by Poor households as unskilled labour. As we explain in Section 3.1 there exists adequate empirical
evidence associating wealth and skills.
9Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) use a learning by doing specication by including hours of work and education
as inputs. On the contrary, in our model, as in Daniel and Gao (2015), we allow for a production function that
combines a time input and a good input so as to assess the e¤ects of public education spending as an additional
productivity enhancing scal instrument.
10 get  g
e
t
N
where get is total public spending on education.
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Each Rich household in any given period t, chooses cR;t; kR;t+1, hR;t+1; bR;t+1; eR;t; lR;t to
maximize its lifetime utility subject to the constraints (4) (in which we incorporate (6) and
(7)) and (5) taking factor prices and policy as given. Dening as R;t and  R;t the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (4) and (5) respectively, the rst-order conditions are given by:
R;t =
1
(1 +  ct)
 
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (8)
1
(1 +  ct) (cR;t + g
c
t )
=


1  k +  1  kt+1 rt+1 
1 +  ct+1
  
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (9)
 R;t = R;t+1

1   lt

wR;t+1lR;t+1 +  R;t+1(1  h) (10)
1
(1 +  ct) (cR;t + g
c
t )
=

 
1 + rbt+1
 
1 +  ct+1
  
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (11)
2
1  eR;t   lR;t =  R;txRBR (eR;t)
 1
h
(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR 1 (12)
2
1  eR;t   lR;t = R;t

1   lt

wR;thR;t (13)
2.4 Poor households
Each Poor household, P; maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility given by:
VP;0 = E0
1X
t=0
tUP;t (cP;t; zP;t; g
c
t ) (14)
The period utility function UP;t (:) is increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments where
we use the same functional form for preferences and the same time constraint as before.11 The
within period budget constraint of each Poor household is given by:
(1 +  ct) cP;t =

1   lt

wP;tlP;thP;t + trP;t (15)
where wP;t is the wage rate received by Poor households which supply unskilled labour services,
trP;t  trP;tNP is public transfers per Poor household. As before, the law motion of human capital
of each household of type, P , is:
hP;t+1 = (1  h)hP;t +BP
h
(eP;t)
  geP;t1 ixP (16)
11Notation and functional forms are analogous to Rich households.
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where geP;t  (1  !) get is the amount of total public spending on education services enjoyed
by each P .12 Each Poor household, P , maximizes its lifetime utility in any given period t by
choosing cP;t; hP;t+1; eP;t; lP;t subject to the constraints (15) and (16) taking factor prices and
policy as given. Dening as P;t and  P;t the Lagrange multipliers associated with (15) and (16)
respectively, the rst-order conditions are given by:
P;t =
1
(1 +  ct)
 
cP;t+1 + gct+1
 (17)
 P;t = P;t+1

1   lt

wP;t+1lP;t+1 +  P;t+1(1  h) (18)
2
1  eP;t   lP;t =  P;txPBP  (eP;t)
 1
h
(eP;t)
  geP;t1 ixP 1 (19)
2
1  eP;t   lP;t = P;t

1   lt

wP;thP;t (20)
2.5 Firms
There are f = 1; 2:::; Nf identical rms owned by the Rich households. Each rm, f , acts
competitively taking prices as given. Firms objective is to maximize prots:
ft  yft   rtkft   wR;tlfR;t   wP;tlfP;t (21)
where yft is rm f
0s output. Firms utilize four factors inputs to produce an homogeneous good,
i.e. physical capital, kft , skilled labour services rented from Rich households, l
f
R;t; unskilled
labour services rented from Poor households, lfP;t, and aggregate public capital, k
g
t . Production
is given by the following constant returns to scale (CRS) and constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function similar to Krusell et al. (2000):
yft = A

m

lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv 
(kgt )
1  (22)
where A > 0 is scale parameter, 0 < ; ;m < 1 are factor inputs share parameters and ; v  1
are parameters governing factor elasticities (see below for more details). Each rm f maximizes
its prots (21) subject to its production function (22) by choosing kft ; l
f
R;t; l
f
P;t. First order
12This is meant to be not only formal education (i.e. secondary or tertiary education spending), but could
resemble other types of educational programmes such as vocational training, on-the-job learning, continuing
professional development programmes among others. This type of investment is of special importance for the less
skilled or less wealthy members in the society since it increases their productivity and labour earnings.
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conditions are given by:
rt = A (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv 1


kft
v 1


m

lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv  1
(kgt )
1  (23)
wR;t = A (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv 1
(1  )

lfR;t
v 1
(24)


m

lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv  1
(kgt )
1 
wP;t = Am

lfP;t
 1 
m

lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv  1
(kgt )
1  (25)
Notice that each rm, f , makes extraordinary prots given by ft = (1  ) yft as in Guo and
Lansing (1997). Combining equations (24) and (25), the skill premium is given by:
wR;t
wP;t
= (1  ) 1 m
m
 
lfP;t
lfR;t
!1  "

 
kft
lfR;t
!
+ (1  )
#

 1
(26)
The di¤erent roles in the production function for skilled (Rich) and unskilled (Poor) labour
give rise to the so called skill-premium, meaning that wRwP > 1. In Section 3.1 we calibrate the
associated parameters in the production function so that the implied factor input elasticities and
the resulting skill premium are in line with empirical studies.13 The elasticities of substitution
between physical capital and skilled labour and between skilled and unskilled labour is 11 
whereas the elasticity between capital and skilled labour is 11 v . This formulation implies that
as long as  > v the production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Moreover, this
specication implies that the skill premium will be ceteris paribus increasing in physical capital,
kfR;t (known as the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect) and decreasing in the skilled to unskilled
labour ratio, l
f
R
lfP
(known as the relative skill supply e¤ect).14
2.6 Government
The within-period government budget constraint government is given (in per capita terms):
gct + g
i
t + g
e
t + trR;t + trP;t + (1 + r
b
t )bt = bt+1 +  t (27)
13See Krueger et al. (2010) for an empirical investigation on the level and the evolution, over time, of several
dimensions of economics inequality.
14 It is straightforward to show that
@

wR
wP

@k
f
R
> 0 and
@

wR
wP

@
 
l
f
R
l
f
P
! < 0:
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where bt  nRbR;t denotes the end-of-period stock of government bonds, git  g
i
N is per capita
public investment and  t denotes total tax revenues in per capita terms dened as:
 t   ct (nRcR;t + nP cP;t) + kt nR (rtkR;t + R;t) +  lt (nPwP;tlP;thP;t + nRwR;tlR;thR;t) (28)
Each period t government sets eight scal instruments, i.e. ve public spending instruments,
namely utility-enhancing spending, public education and investment and transfers to Rich and
Poor households and three tax instruments, namely capital, labour and consumption taxes. In
our simulations below the residual policy instrument is always public debt. The law motion of
public capital is given by:
kgt+1 = (1  g) kgt + git (29)
For notational convenience, concerning public spending policy instruments, we dene them in
terms of their GDP shares sg
i
t  g
i
t
nfyft
, sg
e
t  g
e
t
nfyft
, sg
c
t  g
c
t
nfyft
, strPt  nP trP;tnfyft , s
trR
t  nRtrR;tnfyft ,
where we also express the number of Rich , Poor and rms in terms of shares nR  NRN ,
nP  NPN = 1  nR, nf  N
f
N = nR.
2.7 Fiscal policy rules
Fiscal policy sets its spending-tax instruments following simple scal policy rules, meaning that
it reacts to the public debt-to-GDP ratio deviation from a target. In particular we allow all the
main policy instruments t = fsg
c
t ; s
gi
t ; s
ge
t ; s
trP
t ; s
trR
t ; 
c
t ; 
l
t; 
k
t g to react to the public debt-to-
GDP ratio, qt 1  nRbtnfyt 1 , as deviation from a target according to a simple linear rule:
t    = q (qt 1   q) (30)
where ; q denote scal policy targets and q are feedback policy coe¢ cients. q 6 0 if t is a
spending instrument and q > 0 if t is a tax instrument (see equations (57)-(64) in Appendix).
2.8 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
DCE is dened as a sequence of allocations, prices and policies such that: (i) all household
types maximize welfare, (ii) rms maximize prots, (iii) goods, capital, labor and bond markets
clear, (iv) dividends markets clear, (v) policymakers follow the feedback rules assumed, (vi) all
constraints are satised.
We thus end up with a rst order non-linear dynamic equilibrium system summarized
by 29 equations in 29 unknowns fyft ; cR;t; cP;t; kR;t+1; hR;t+1; hP;t+1; bR;t+1; eR;t; eP;t; lR;t; lP;t, rbt ;
R;t; P;t;  R;t;  P;t; k
g
t ; rt; wR;t; wP;t; qtg and fsg
i
t ; s
gct
t ; s
ge
t ; s
trP
t ; s
trR
t ; 
c
t ; 
l
t; 
k
t g. This is given ini-
tial conditions for the state variables and the values of the feedback scal policy coe¢ cients in
the associated scal policy rules. We present the full equilibrium system in the Appendix.
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2.9 Plan of the rest of the paper
In the rest of the paper we work as follows: First, using commonly employed structural parameter
values and scal policy data from the EA-18 over the period 2001-2015 we solve for the steady
state solution of the model in Section 3. We explain our calibration strategy in Section 3.1. The
long-run solution is computed in Section 3.2. Throughout the paper we refer to this solution as
the "status-quo" economy. In our policy experiments we use this solution as point of departure
in order to evaluate alternative debt consolidation policies.
Second, we compute various steady state reformed economies in which public debt-to-GDP
ratio is lower; details are given in Section 4. Notice that, thanks to public debt reduction one
scal instrument can adjust in the reformed steady state to reap the benet of the scal adjust-
ment (scal gain). We study various reformed economies depending on which scal instrument
adjusts in the new steady state. Aggregate and distributional long-run e¤ects are computed in
section 5.1.
Third, we compute the transition dynamics from the status quo economy with high debt-to-
GDP ratio to the various reformed economies with lower public debt-to-GDP ratio. During the
transition, scal policy should decrease spending or/and increase tax instruments to bring public
debt-to-GDP ratio down to its new lower target (scal pain). In what follows, we study ad-hoc
and optimized consolidation policies. In particular, we study two ad-hoc policy scenarios, tax-
and spending-based policies, and we compare these scenarios with an optimized policy scenario.
Details on policy scenarios are discussed in Section 4 while results on the transition are presented
in Section 5.2 and 5.3.
3 Calibration and status-quo long-run equilibrium
In the following section we discuss how we choose the value of the model parameters and present
the long-run solution of the model.
3.1 Parameter values and scal policy data
In Table 1a we report the values of the structural parameters. In Table 1b we report the scal
policy instruments values using scal data averages for the EA-18 over the period 2001-2015.
Both parameter values and scal policy instruments are chosen so that the models long-run
solution mimics various key macroeconomic ratios of the EA-18 economy. We use data from the
AMECO database of the European Commission, and Eurostats databases, COFOG (Classi-
cation of Functions of Government), LFS (Labour Force Survey), EU-SILC (Social Income and
Living Conditions), Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). Below we analyse in
detail our calibration strategy.
Population shares As said above households di¤er in two dimensions, access to nancial
markets and skills. We set nP = 0:3 and nR = 0:7 so that 30% of total population do not
participate in capital and nancial markets which is in the range reported by Coenen et al.
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(2008). This is in line with data on household savings in HFCS which reports that the assymetric
savings distribution is also reected in income distribution. For instance in the Euro Area the
richest 20% income group holds over 60% of total savings. Turning to the skills distribution as
those are dened by educational attainment (ISCED), data from Eurostat indicate that in the
EA-18 around 30% to 35% has at least attained lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2; 10 years
of education) while the rest has attained at least upper-secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary
and tertiary education (ISCED 3-8) which roughly matches our parameter choices for nR and
nP . Finally, data from EU-SILC reveal that high income groups as well as high savings groups
in the population show relatively higher educational attainment rates. Thus, we believe there
exists enough evidence to associate savings and income with skills and education.
Preferences and parameters common to all agents The time discount factor  is set
to give an annual real interest rate of about 2.25% which is consistent with data on EA-18 (see
AMECO database). The preference parameters f1; 2; g are calibrated so that the weighted
average of skilled and unskilled hours worked is around 0.25. It also implies that in steady-
state Rich households devote more time to labour relative to Poor (see Table 2 in the next
subsection).15 We set the depreciation rates of physical and public capital

k; g
	
equal to 6%,
as in Coenen et al. (2008). Given that there is not a clear consensus on the magnitude of the
depreciation of human capital we assume h = k = g = 6%.
Production We normalize the scale parameter A to 1. We use the estimates of Krusell et al.
(2000) for the elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled labour, v =  0:495,1=(1 
v) = 0:668, and between capital/skilled labour and unskilled labour,  = 0:401,1=(1   ) =
0:1666. We then choose the remaining parameters of the production function, f;mg, so that
the models status quo solution is consistent with data on factor inputs shares such as labour
income share, capital income share and inequality variables like skill premium (for the latter
see Krueger et al. (2010)). The choice of the parameter  along with the depreciation rate
of physical and public capital imply a physical capital to GDP ratio around 2.5 and a public
capital to GDP ratio around 0.15.
Human capital Next, we set the parameters governing the production of new human capital
of each household type. The sets of parameters fBR; BP g and fxR; xP g both relate to technology
and ability in the creation of new human capital and skills. For this reason, similar to He and
Liu (2008) and Angelopoulos et. al (2017) we set BR = BP and let xR = 0:450 > xP = 0:400 to
capture di¤erences in ability between the two household types. This choice reects the idea that
Rich households, due to their higher education status, obtain higher returns. The literature has
not reached a consensus for the value of the elasticity parameter of education time with respect
to new human capital . We set a value of 0.8 so that (1  ) = 0:2 as in Blankenau et al.
(2004). This implies that households devote around 9% on average of their time endowment
to skill enhancing activities. Note that in the model both time spent on education and public
15This is accordance with the Eurostats Labour Force Survey series which reports that workers in skilled occu-
pations (e.g. managers, professionals, engineers) record higher weekly hours of work than less skilled occupations
(e.g. clerical stu¤, technicians etc).
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education spending are meant to be post-schooling. This implies that both agents have already
acquired a minimum of 10 years of education.
Policy We set scal policy variables in steady state equal to the EA-18 scal data averages
over the period 2001-2015. In particular, we use e¤ective average tax rates following Mendoza
et al. (1994). Namely, e¤ective tax rate on consumption is 19.6%, e¤ective tax rate on labour is
46.6% and e¤ective tax rate on capital is 36.7%.16 Regarding the public spending instruments
we set the share of total government expenditure as a share of GDP to be around 49% and
transfers as a share of GDP around 15%; this gives a public debt to GDP ratio around 85%
which is consistent with data from AMECO database.17 As said in the previous sections we
assume that transfers are unevenly distributed between the two household groups favouring
Poor households. Given the di¢ culty to pin-down the exact share allocated to each household
type we assume that Poor households receive double the amount of transfers relative to Rich
households as a share of GDP. The rest of the public expenditure sub-components are extracted
from Eurostats COFOG database which breaks down public spending per functional use. This
helps us to disentangle total public spending into its main components. For instance public
spending on education sg
e
, is set at 1%, which is close to the post schooling public spending
on education. For simplicity we assume that this share, is equally allocated between the two
household types, i.e. we set ! = 0:5. Spending on public investment as a share of GDP sg
i
, is
set at 3%, based on data reported in the Economic A¤airs function of the COFOG database.
Finally utility-enhancing government consumption sg
c
t is set equal to 30%.18
16E¤ective tax rates are taken from Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2018).
17Particularly we use the time series "General government consolidated gross debt - Excessive decit procedure
based on ESA 2010".
18According to the COFOG dataset we can dene this share to include a broad range of government func-
tions such as general public services, public order and defence, recreation and culture, environmental protection,
household and community amenities, health which is close to our chosen value as a share of GDP.
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Table 1a: Parameter values
Parameter Denition Value
Households
0    1 time discount factor 0.978
0 <  < 1 public consumption weight in composite consumption 0.100
1 > 0 preference weight in the utility 0.400
2 > 0 preference weight in the utility 0.600
0  k  1 depreciation rate of physical capital 0.060
0  h  1 depreciation rate of human capital 0.060
0  g  1 depreciation rate of public capital 0.060
0 < nR < 1 population share of Rich 0.700
0 < nP < 1 population share of Poor 0.300
Production
0 <  < 1 share of composite input 0.980
 < 1 capital and skilled labour to unskilled labour substitution 0.401
v < 1 capital to skilled labour substitution -0.495
0 < m < 1 labour share of Rich 0.300
0 <  < 1 share of physical capital in the composite input 0.400
0    1 elasticity of education time 0.800
0  1    1 elasticity of public education spending 0.200
A > 0 scale parameter 1.000
BR > 0 human capital technology parameter of Rich 1.000
BP > 0 human capital technology parameter of Poor 1.000
0 < xR < 1 returns to scale for new human capital of Rich 0.450
0 < xP < 1 returns to scale for new human capital of Poor 0.400
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Table 1b: Fiscal policy instruments
Instrument Denition Value
Tax rates
k capital tax rate 0.367
 lt labour tax rate 0.466
 c consumption tax rate 0.197
Public spending
sg
e
GDP share of public education spending 0.010
sg
c
t GDP share of government consumption 0.300
sg
i
GDP share of public investment 0.030
strR GDP share of government transfers to Rich 0.050
strP GDP share of government transfers to Poor 0.100
3.2 Status quo steady-state solution
The steady-state solution of the model, when we use the parameter values and the policy in-
struments of Tables 1a-1b, is reported in Table 2. In what follows, we refer to this steady-state
solution as the "status-quo" economy and will serve us as the point of departure for the various
policy experiments studied in the next sections. The implied numerical solution mimics some
key macroeconomic ratios observed for the EA-18 like consumption as a share of output, physical
capital as a share of output, debt-to-GDP and skill premium.
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Table 2: Status quo solution
Main variables Model
cR consumption of Rich 0.1555
cP consumption of Poor 0.1091
lR skilled labour 0.2748
lP unskilled labour 0.1772
eR time in education of Rich 0.1399
eP time in education of Poor 0.0850
r real return to physical capital 0.0562
rb return to bonds 0.0224
y output 0.3584
Key ratios Model Data
c
y =
nRcR+nRcR
nfy
consumption as share of GDP 0.5680 0.5460
nRkR
nfy
physical capital as share of GDP 2.5297 2.9600
nRbR
nfy
debt as a share of GDP 0.8500 0.8700
wR
wP
skill premium 1.3801 1.7100
4 Fiscal policy experiments
In this section we dene in more detail the scal policy experiments studied. Our thought
experiment is the following. The economy starts from its status-quo steady-state computed
in Table 2 and travels towards a new reformed steady-state with lower public debt-to-GDP
ratio. Since public debt-to-GDP ratio is lower in the reformed economy, government can exploit
the scal space by increasing public spending or/and reducing distortionary taxation. In what
follows we study various reformed economies adjusting one scal instrument at a time. More
specically, in the new reformed economy debt-output ratio reduces from 85% which is the EA-
18 data average over the period 2001-2015 to 60%; at the same time this reduction allows one
spending (tax) instrument to increase (decrease) taking advantage of the scal space created by
the debt reduction. The 60% is chosen simply to reect the criteria set by the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Government can achieve the transition from status-quo to the new reformed steady-state by
implementing di¤erent scal policy mixes. In the transition scal policy sets its scal instruments
following scal feedback rules given by equations (57)-(64) in the Appendix. We study both ad-
hoc and optimized policy scenarios. In the ad-hoc policy scenarios the associated feedback policy
coe¢ cients are set ad-hoc (see below) to reduce debt-output ratio either via tax hikes (referred
16
to as the tax-based scenario) or, via spending cuts (referred to as the spending-based scenario).
In the tax-based scenario, we set the feedback policy coe¢ cients in the associated scal
rules so as tax revenues increase by around 2% on impact and over the next 5 years of debt
consolidation; while all spending instruments are kept constant to their data averages. Similarly,
in the spending based consolidation we set the feedback policy coe¢ cients so as total public
spending decrease by around 2% over the same period; while all tax instruments are kept constant
at their data averages. For reasons of comparison of the two ad-hoc scenarios, we also impose
additional restrictions on the feedback policy coe¢ cients. That is debt-to-GDP ratio should
reduce at the same speed under both scenarios while scal instruments should uctuate close to
their historical data averages.
On the other hand, in the optimized policy scenario we compute the optimized values of feed-
back policy coe¢ cients in the associated scal rules following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
meaning that scal policy chooses its feedback policy coe¢ cients to maximize a welfare criterion.
The welfare criterion is the weighted conditional welfare of the Rich and Poor households as de-
ned in (1) and (14) respectively, i.e. W0 = RVR;0 + (1  R)VP;0 where R denotes the weight
assigned to Rich householdslifetime welfare.19 Notice that welfare is computed conditional on
the initial conditions which are given by the status quo solution computed in Table 2.20
In Section 5.1 we report the implications of debt consolidation in the long-run. In turn, in
Section 5.2, we present results in the transition under various ad-hoc and optimized scenarios.
Finally in Section 5.3 we conduct welfare analysis.
5 Results
5.1 Aggregate and distributional e¤ects of debt consolidation in the long-run
In the reformed economies, once debt-output ratio has been reduced government can increase
spending or/and decrease tax instruments to take advantage of the scal space; this is the so
called long-run scal gain of debt consolidation (see e.g. Coenen et al. 2008 and Philippopoulos
et al. 2015). In this section we discuss the long-run aggregate and distributional implications
of scal consolidation by varying the scal instrument that adjusts in the new reformed steady
state. In particular, we rank alternative scenarios according to their e¤ects on the aggregate
economy as well as to their e¤ects on income and wage distribution. To do this, we compute
variables such as aggregate output, net income ratio (income inequality) and skill premium (wage
inequality). Net income ratio is dened as the ratio of net income earned by Rich households
19We study the case of a Benthamite, or utilitarian government in the sense that the weights R and P in the
social welfare function are equal to the population shares,nR and nP of Rich and Poor agents respectively.
20 In particular, we take a second-order approximation to both the equilibrium conditions and the welfare
criterion. First, we compute a second-order approximation of both conditional welfare and the decentralized
equilibrium around the reformed steady state as functions of the vector of feedback policy coe¢ cients. Then,
we use an optimization routine like fminsearch.m to compute the values of the feedback policy coe¢ cients that
maximize the conditional welfare criterion. For more details see Philippopoulos et al. 2017a and 2017b. Dynare
and Matlab routines are available upon request.
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to net income earned by Poor households and allow us to evaluate the e¤ect of a scal reform
on the income distribution of the economy. If the latter increases (decreases) the income gap
between Rich and Poor widens (shrinks).
In Table 3 we vary the residual scal instrument that adjusts in the long run and present
the associated values of output, net income ratio and skill premium. All values in Table 3 are
reported as percentage deviations from their status quo values; notice that a positive (negative)
value implies an increase (decrease) vis-à-vis its status quo value. In particular, in the rst
column of Table 3 we report which scal instrument adjusts in the new steady state to take
advantage of the post-consolidation scal space while in the last column we compute the mag-
nitude of the associated adjustment. The scal instruments which adjusts in the new reformed
economies are respectively: the output share of government consumption, sg
c
t , the output share
of government investment, sg
i
, the output share of public transfers to Poor households, strP , the
output share of public spending on education, sg
e
consumption,  c, labour,  l, and capital, k,
tax rates. Finally, from second to fourth columns we report the implied percentage deviations of
aggregate output, y, net income ratio, y
net
R
ynetP
, and skill premium, wRwP respectively.
21 To understand
the mechanisms of each reform we experiment with one spending/tax policy instrument at a
time keeping the others constant at their status quo value.
Table 3: Steady state output and distributional e¤ects
in the various reformed economies (as % deviations from status-quo)
Fiscal
Instr.
y
ynetR
ynetP
wR
wP
Inst
sg
c
0.0093 -0.0117 -0.0102 0.0047
sg
i
0.0152 -0.0110 -0.0093 0.0047
strP 0.0046 -0.0429 -0.0419 0.0054
sg
e
0.0270 -0.0107 -0.0153 0.0047
 c 0.0107 -0.0118 -0.0097 -0.0098
 l 0.0181 -0.0067 -0.0034 -0.0101
k 0.0196 -0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0121
A key message that can be derived from Table 3 is that debt consolidation is always output
enhancing; notice that output increases vis-a-vis its status quo value in all reformed economies
(see column 2 in Table 3). Such policies can also induce positive e¤ects on the income dis-
tribution, e.g. net income ratio decreases in almost all reformed economies (see column 3 in
Table 3). Thus, in the long-run debt consolidation polices enhance both equity and e¢ ciency
(for short-run see discussion in Section 5.2 and 5.3). Below we discuss in more detail results on
output, net income ratio and skill premium by reformed economy.
Regarding output, as expected debt consolidation is more productive in the long-run when
government increases productive spending (like public spending on education or investment) or
21Net income is dened as gross income minus all types of taxes.
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reduces distortionary taxation.
Net income ratio decreases in almost all reformed economies which means that debt consoli-
dation policies benets relatively more Poor households. This is mostly driven by the sharp de-
crease in income from government bonds earned by Rich households in all reformed economies.22
The reduction in net income of Rich households is less striking when government reduces in-
come taxes (see the last two rows in Table 3) for two reasons. First, lower income taxes imply
higher wealth; recall that Rich households earn capital income while receive relatively higher
wages than Poor households. Second, due to complementarity between physical capital and
skilled labour the resulting increase in output requires additional physical capital and as a result
more skilled than unskilled labour. These moderate the adverse e¤ects on net income of Rich
households due to to the decrease in income from bond holdings.
In terms of wage inequality (see column 4 in Table 3), debt consolidation always reduces skill
premium.23
5.2 Aggregate and distributional e¤ects of debt consolidation in the transi-
tion
In this section, we focus our analysis on the transition implications of public debt consolidation.
The economy departs from its status quo steady state and moves towards a new reformed
economy with lower debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 60%.24 This requires scal policy to use one (or
more) scal instruments to react to debt deviations from its new target. We experiment with ad-
hoc and optimized policies as analyzed in Section 4. Regarding ad-hoc policies, we distinguish
between two debated scenarios referred to as the tax-based and the spending-based scenario
respectively. Table 4 presents model-based simulations for output, net income ratio and skill
premium under ad-hoc policies.25 We report results over various time horizons, in particular we
compute the average percentage deviation of each endogenous variable from its status quo value.
For example, under tax (spending)-based consolidation scenario average recession is -1.95% (-
0.4%) for the rst two years of debt consolidation.
22These ndings are in line with Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2015). However, they focus on consumption
inequality rather than net income and wages.
23The net e¤ect on skill premium depends on which of the capital-skill complementarity or the relative skill
supply e¤ect dominates. On the one hand, the increase in output requires more physical capital pushing skill
premium upwards. On the other hand, relative skill supply increases pushing skill premium in the opposite
direction. In our experiments the latter e¤ect is stronger.
24To save space, we present results for the transition to the reformed economy in which government consumption
is the scal instrument that adjusts to reap the benet of debt reduction. Results from the associated transitional
dynamics when the economy travels towards the rest of the reformed economies reported in Table 3 are available
upon request. Here we report that our main qualitative results do not change.
25Table 4 and 5 present results from model-based simulations generated by the rst-order approximation of the
equilibrium system.
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Table 4: Output, net income ratio and skill premium
over various time horizons with ad-hoc policies (% deviations from SQ)
Panel A: Tax-based consolidation
2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
y -0.0195 -0.0185 -0.0175 -0.0153
ynetR
ynetP
-0.0613 -0.0555 -0.0502 -0.0419
wR
wP
0.0215 0.0177 0.0143 0.0089
Notes: Feedback (tax) coe¢ cients are
cq = 0:07, 
l
q = 0:07, 
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q = 0:07;
g
c
q = 
ge
q = 
gi
q = 
trR
q = 
trP
q = 0:
Panel B: Spending-based consolidation
2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
y -0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0018 0.0000
ynetR
ynetP
0.0035 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0035
wR
wP
0.0357 0.0328 0.0301 0.0251
Notes: Feedback (spending) coe¢ cients are
g
c
q = 0:05; 
ge
q = 0:002,
g
i
q = 0:007, 
trR
q = 0:02, 
trP
q = 0:02;
cq = 
l
q = 
k
q = 0
Comparison of y in Panel A and B of Table 4 implies that spending-based scal consolida-
tion is less recessionary than tax-based. That is in aggregate (output) terms spending-based
consolidation is more productive over all time horizons. However, spending-based consolidation
comes at a distributional cost as it seems to be more harmful for income and wage distribu-
tion. Tax-based and spending-based consolidation policies have di¤erent implications on the
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ generated by debt consolidation in the short/medium run. In par-
ticular, tax-based consolidation comes at a higher aggregate cost but smoother distributional
impact while spending-based consolidation policies cause negative distribution e¤ects but are
less harmful on aggregate. The logic of these results is the following.
Regarding output, debt consolidation either through tax hikes or spending cuts results in a
contraction; however under spending cuts the latter is mitigated due to crowding in e¤ects of
private consumption and investment of Rich households. While as it is well known distortionary
tax increases have negative supply-side e¤ects that cause a stronger and more prolonged output
reduction. In terms of income distribution though, relatively higher income taxes (especially
on capital) and the sharper fall of real rates under the tax-based scenario close the income gap
over the rst 10 years of consolidation. Finally, in terms of wage inequality, skill premium rises
relatively more and for a prolonged period under spending based scenario. Both relative labor
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supply and capital-skill complementarity e¤ect shift upward the skill premium in the short- and
medium-run.26
In Table 4 we study ad-hoc debt consolidation policies, meaning that scal policy sets ad-
hoc its feedback policy coe¢ cients in the associated scal rules. However, it is well known that
the scal policy mix (see e.g. Leeper 2010) chosen to bring public debt down have important
macroeconomic implications. In our case, the scal policy mix is governed by the choice of
feedback policy coe¢ cients. For that reason, we also study a more ambitious debt consolidation
scenario that does not depend on an ad-hoc choice of these policy coe¢ cients. That is scal
policy sets feedback policy coe¢ cients optimally to maximize social welfare as analyzed in Section
4. We call this scal consolidation scenario optimized policy. Results are reported in Table 5
(which is comparable to Table 4). The main results are as follows.
In terms of policy reaction, the optimized policy mix implies that scal policy should cut
government consumption sharply and increase consumption tax to consolidate its debt while at
the same time keep constant income taxation and productive public spending. The resulting
optimized values of feedback policy coe¢ cients reported in the notes of Table 5 suggest that
increasing distortionary income taxation or decreasing productive spending to reduce public
debt is not recommended.
Table 5 also presents simulations for output, net income ratio and skill premium with opti-
mized scal rules. Inspection of Table 5 implies that debt consolidation can be productive over
all time horizons in terms of output. Actually, debt consolidation can be expansionary under the
optimally chosen scal consolidation mix. On the other hand, although optimized scal policy
rules cannot eliminate the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ of debt consolidation can balance between
equity and e¢ ciency better than ad-hoc policies. To sum up, comparison of Table 5 with 4
implies that the transition aggregate cost of debt consolidation consolidation can be avoided
while the equity-e¢ ciency trade o¤ can be mitigated if the scal policy chooses optimal its scal
consolidation mix.
Table 5: Output, net income and skill premium
over various time horizons with optimized policy
2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
y 0.0049 0.0153 0.0173 0.0177
ynetR
ynetP
-0.0383 -0.0361 -0.0340 -0.0305
wR
wP
0.0447 0.0259 0.0191 0.0121
Notes: Optimized policy coe¢ cients are g
c
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5.3 Welfare e¤ects
So far our analysis focuses on key endogenous variables of the model that captures aggregate and
distributional e¤ects. Similar studies usually examine the e¤ects of scal consolidation on welfare
26 Implied response functions from status quo steady state to the new reformed steady state of all endogenous
variables are available upon request.
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(see e.g. Bi and Kumhof 2011 and Philippopoulos et al. 2017a and 2017b). Policy should also
be concerned with welfare since a welfare criterion can summarize the multiple trade-o¤s faced
by policy makers when they plan their policy actions. To this end, in this section we compute
social, Rich and Poor householdswelfare over various time horizons for all scal consolidation
scenarios developed above. Table 6 presents social and household-specic welfare as percentage
deviations from a reference regime27 under ad-hoc scal consolidation policies while Table 7
presents similar welfare computations under optimized policy.28 The main results are, rst,
ad-hoc debt consolidation policies are harmful for social welfare over all time horizons; this is
consistent with output ndings in Table 4. Second, Rich households are better o¤ while Poor
households are worse o¤ over the rst 10 years of debt consolidation. This implies that ad-hoc
policies can increase inequality in the short- and medium-run in terms of welfare as well. In
addition, the increase in inequality is more striking under spending-based than tax-based scal
consolidation. As can be seen in Table 6 welfare of Poor (Rich) households reduces (increases)
more under spending-based consolidation (compare Panel A 4th and 5th row with Panel B 9th
and 10th row). Welfare results in Table 7 imply that optimized policy always performs better
than ad-hoc policies and this is over all time horizons and across all households. That is as also
highlighted in the previous section with optimized policy short-run costs of debt consolidation
can be avoided for society as a whole (see second row of Table 7). At the same time, optimized
policy can mitigate the short-run negative inequality e¤ect meaning that the reduction in Poor
householdswelfare is lower than the one caused by ad-hoc policies (compare Tables 7 and 6).
Finally, both households are better o¤ after the rst six years of debt consolidation policies.
27We can use multiple reference regimes, for simplicity we compute percentage deviations from a reference
regime in which the economy stays at its status-quo steady state forever.
28Table 6 and 7 present results from model-based simulations generated by the second-order approximation of
the equilibrium system and welfare criterion.
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Table 6: Welfare over various time horizons under ad-hoc policies
Panel A: Tax-based consolidation
2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
Social
Welfare
-0.002 -0.0081 -0.0164 -0.0357
Rich 0.0089 0.0099 0.0058 -0.0108
Poor -0.0273 -0.0502 -0.0683 -0.0939
Notes: Feedbacks as in Table 4.
Panel B: Spending-based consolidation
2 years 4 years 6 years 15 years
Social
Welfare
-0.0032 -0.0055 -0.0072 -0.0099
Rich 0.0117 0.0206 0.027 0.0338
Poor -0.0378 -0.0662 -0.0869 -0.1119
Notes: Feedbacks as in Table 4.
Table 7: Welfare over various time horizons with optimized policy
2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
Social
Welfare
0.0097 0.0280 0.0415 0.0594
Rich 0.0252 0.0418 0.0539 0.0679
Poor -0.0265 -0.0041 0.0125 0.0394
Notes: Feedbacks as in Table 5.
6 Robustness
This section reports our robustness analysis. In particular, we have experimented with larger
and lower values of the complementarity parameter, v, i.e with lower and higher elasticity of
substitution between physical capital and skilled labor in the range of 0:33 < 11 v < 0:90. We
have also experimented with the case in which Poor households have access to capital and
nancial markets. In this way we eliminate heterogeneity in asset holdings. That is Poor
households can now smooth their consumption and thus capital-skill complementarity a¤ects
their capital and income to a smaller extent. We report that our main qualitative results do not
depend on this parameter and modelling changes.
7 Conclusions and possible extensions
In this paper using a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and capital-
skill complementarity in the production function we assess the aggregate and distributional
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implications of public debt consolidation. To conduct our scal policy experiments we compare
ad-hoc and optimized feedback scal policy rules. Since the main results have been summarized
in the Introduction, we close with possible extensions.
A possible extension is to depart from the closed economy setup and study similar questions
in an open economy setup allowing for international mobility of capital and labour (i.e. migra-
tion). Consequently, this leaves room of introducing cross-border e¤ects. Due to the mobility
of capital and labour, scal consolidation policies could a¤ect aggregate and distributional out-
comes through additional channels e.g. changes in the national tax base or household-biased
capital or/and migration controls among others. We leave these ideas for future work.
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Appendix
Market clearing conditions
Market clearing conditions in the capital market, the dividends market, the labour (skilled and
unskilled) market, the government bonds market are respectively:
nfkft = nRkR;t (31)
nfft = nRR;t (32)
nf lfR;t = nRlR;thR;t (33)
nf lfP;t = nP lP;thP;t (34)
bt = nRbR;t (35)
The economys aggregate resource constraint is given by:
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where we express the number of Rich and Poor households in terms of shares nR  NRN , nP 
NP
N = 1  nR.
Full equilibrium system
The full equilibrium system is given in detail by the following 29 equations in 29 unknowns which
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Feedback scal policy rules are given by:
sg
c
t   sg
c
= g
c
q (qt 1   q) (57)
sg
i
t   sg
i
= g
i
q (qt 1   q) (58)
strPt   strP = trPq (qt 1   q) (59)
strRt   strR = trRq (qt 1   q) (60)
sg
e
t   sg
e
= g
e
q (qt 1   q) (61)
 ct    c = cq (qt 1   q) (62)
 l    l = lq (qt 1   q) (63)
kt   k = kq (qt 1   q) (64)
qt 1  nRbR;t
nfyft 1
(65)
30
